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Abstract
International business and public policy research have examined the techniques
that multinational enterprises (MNEs) use to shift revenues to subsidiaries in
offshore financial centres (OFCs) in order to minimize tax liability and arbitrage
for their advantage. While study of such tax arbitrage strategies has looked to
geographical locations and legal dimensions to better understand these
strategies, it has ignored the structural and organizational relationship
between MNEs and their subsidiaries. We define two distinct types of OFC-
based corporate entities based on their location among and apparent control
over other MNE affiliates: ‘stand-alone’ OFCs at the end of a chain of MNE
subsidiaries; and ‘in-betweener’ OFCs with equity control over further entities
and hence apparent flexibility to redirect profits to other MNE subsidiaries
further down the chain. We hypothesize that when MNEs have in-betweener
OFCs controlling a substantial share of overall MNE profits, this indicates
greater MNE interest in aggressive tax planning (ATP). We then evaluate
empirical support for our claims based on an ‘equity mapping’ approach
identifying stand-alone and in-betweener OFCs in 100 of the largest MNEs
operating globally. This study demonstrates that a key factor determining tax
arbitrage is not the amount of value registered on OFC subsidiaries’ balance
sheets, but rather the portion of the group’s operating revenues and net
income controlled by OFC subsidiaries. National taxing authorities could
benefit from tracking in-betweener OFC locations and behaviour to counter
ATP strategies, decrease sovereign arbitrage, and increase MNE tax revenue.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we propose that the location and structure of
multinational enterprise (MNE) subsidiary entities registered in
offshore financial centres (OFCs) position those MNEs to engage
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more easily in tax arbitrage among national tax
authorities as part of a broader tax minimization
strategy. We identify two types of MNE subsidiary
entities located at different points in an MNE
subsidiary ‘chain’ running from the parent to some
endpoint: (1) ‘stand-alone’ entities located at the
end of a chain; and (2) ‘in-betweener’ entities as
upstream shareholders who invest in subsidiaries
down the chain. MNEs with in-betweener entities
that control more income may be better positioned
to engage in aggressive tax planning (Avi-Yonah
et al., 2008; Eicke, 2009). To identify the type of
entity and calculate the share of income they
control, we use an ‘equity mapping’ approach. This
allows us to identify stand-alone and in-betweener
entities operating in OFCs in our sample of the 100
largest non-state-owned, non-financial MNEs oper-
ating in 2018. We find that in-betweener entities
operating in OFCs appear less frequently but con-
trol a larger share of overall MNE operating rev-
enues and net income compared to stand-alone
entities operating in OFCs.1 Our analyses con-
tribute to international business (IB) and related
public policy research primarily by providing novel
concepts and empirics to identify MNEs more likely
to engage in aggressive tax planning.
In the past decade, the battle against tax avoid-
ance has intensified. Recent policies target individ-
ual countries and MNEs alongside their (germane)
subsidiaries. The OECD, for instance, has intro-
duced several measures including country black-
listing (Kudrle, 2009; Sharman, 2009), bilateral tax
information model treaties (Sawyer, 2011; Valder-
rama and Johanna, 2010), automatic exchange
agreements (Lesage et al., 2019; Sadiq and Sawyer,
2016), and country-by-country reporting (Tang and
Schultz, 2017). These policies promote comparison
of MNE subsidiary structure with specific tax juris-
dictional data. The EU has been developing policies
designed to isolate potentially ‘artificial’ corporate
entities (Heckemeyer et al., 2017; Loretz et al.,
2017; Panayi, 2015, 2006). Taxation policy over-
sight of MNEs tends to focus on specific subsidiaries
in specific countries.
This geographic focus on the legal dimension
limits tax policy effectiveness. MNE tax minimiza-
tion strategies are not carried out in a single
subsidiary or country. They are implemented across
several MNE subsidiaries not unlike other broader
strategies (Eicke, 2009; Karamanou et al., 2012;
Loretz et al., 2017; Panayi, 2015; Robé, 2011).
Regulation of MNE tax minimization strategies
requires this broader perspective to consider how
MNEs structure their subsidiary corporate entities.
It requires a deeper understanding of how income
and revenue are distributed across MNE subsidiary
operations, and how certain subsidiaries are able to
re-direct that income and revenue to other sub-
sidiaries in OFCs located in countries with lower
tax rates often paired with lax corporate gover-
nance standards. Policies targeting individual MNE
subsidiaries in individual countries fail to account
for this organizational dimension and are more
likely to fail in increasing overall tax revenue. This
dimension helps explain the paradoxical outcome
of a decade of tighter national tax regulation in
many countries with little evidence indicating a
decline in income shifting and tax arbitrage (Claus-
ing, 2016; Cobham and Janský, 2018; Damgaard
et al., 2019).
The prospect of tax arbitrage among different
national taxing authorities prompts new answers to
fundamental questions in IB research about firm
internationalization.2 The vast and expanding lit-
erature on foreign direct investment by MNEs
acknowledges a ‘wide range of potential paths any
firmmight take in internationalization’ (Welch and
Luostarinen, 1999: 87). Yet, we often see only a
narrow part of that range. Why, for instance, does
an MNE in state A invest directly in state B, but
delegate responsibility to an MNE subsidiary for
investment in states C, D, and F? What legal and
regulatory factors applying in that MNE subsidiary
make it a preferred springboard for investment in
states C, D, and F? A common, if implicit, assump-
tion in IB research is that those factors are largely
non-strategic. They are considered administrative
factors for lawyers and accountants tucked in back-
office operations, adding little, if any, value to an
MNE’s competitive position in a given national
market. They are thought to change little, if at all,
in the MNE’s broader internationalization path.
This assumption is a mistake. Lawyers, accountants,
and related professionals contribute qualitatively
different, but nonetheless quite valuable insights
for line managers often less aware of current legal
and regulatory factors in a given country and less
able to anticipate shifts in those factors with
changing governments and policies. Those back-
office professionals can be vital partners for line
managers charting international investment paths
where tax rules and regulations can raise charting
costs or frustrate the charting process altogether
(Eicke, 2009; Karayan et al., 2002).
The policy implications of this analysis are two-
fold. First, we argue that specific ways by which
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MNEs apportion and sequence their corporate
equity structure hold vital clues to the overall
internationalization strategies of the group. Sec-
ond, in paying greater attention to jurisdictional
arbitrage, regulators should cease treating OFC-
registered MNE subsidiaries as an undifferentiated
block of entities that perform more or less similar
functions. Tax arbitrating techniques often exploit
tax credit and amortization rules of high-tax juris-
dictions where an MNEmay be primarily registered,
in combination with MNE subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions to achieve even greater tax saving.
MNE subsidiaries can be classified by their organi-
zational relationship, which distinguishes interme-
diating ‘in-betweeners’ from end point or ‘stand-
alone’ enterprises. More effective taxation regula-
tion requires a more focused approach, centring on
those intermediating ‘in-betweeners’ that appear to
play a vital role in facilitating tax arbitrage.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four
additional sections. ‘‘Foundational Concepts and
Literature’’ section immediately below discusses
important foundational concepts and background
literature. There, we contrast the organizational
versus legal dimensions the MNE. We then discuss
the international tax practices and challenges
associated with studying those practices. ‘‘An
Equity-Mapping Approach to Analysing Interna-
tional Tax Arbitrage Ability in MNEs’’ section
discusses our equity-mapping approach to meeting
those research challenges. There, we show how to
identify MNE subsidiary ownership chains and
introduce/distinguish two types of subsidiaries
important to understanding how well-positioned
an MNE is to engage in international tax arbitrage:
stand-alone subsidiaries located in off-shore finan-
cial centre (OFC) countries and appearing at the
end of a given MNE subsidiary chain; and in-
betweener subsidiaries, also located in OFCs but
appearing somewhere above a given MNE sub-
sidiary chain. We use new data on MNE ownership
in these different subsidiary types to discern where
MNEs have more or less ability to shift income to
other subsidiaries in countries where tax treatment
is more favourable. Findings from Equity Mapping’’
section presents findings from application of our
equity-mapping approach to the operations of 100
large MNEs operating in 2018. There, we show that
in-betweener subsidiaries are less frequent than
stand-alone subsidiaries but control substantially
more MNE income and related revenues for tax
arbitrage purposes. MNEs with in-betweener sub-
sidiaries controlling more of both are better
positioned to engage in aggressive tax planning
(ATP) strategies. ‘‘Conclusion’’ section concludes
our paper with a recitation of our central research
goals and key findings, their implications for
research and related public policy, and the future
research directions they open up for scholars in IB
and related fields.
FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE
Organizational Versus Legal Dimensions
of the MNE
MNEs have evolved in the past three or four
decades into highly complex, multi-subsidiary,
multi-jurisdictional organizations, often spanning
hundreds, if not thousands, of independent corpo-
rate entities, linked by a complex web of ownership
arrangements (Avraham et al., 2012; UNCTAD,
2016). These organizations are typically viewed as
singular economic actors, which in many ways they
are. However, MNEs are technically legal constructs
with a parent corporation as the sole or controlling
shareholder of multiple, separately incorporated
subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures and the like,
often located in diverse jurisdictions (Blumberg,
1993; Matheson, 2008; Robé, 2011; Lambooy et al.,
2013; Adriano, 2015). Each subsidiary is a separate
legal person, subject to ‘the internal affairs doc-
trine’, i.e. the rules and regulations, including
corporate governance rules, of its country of regis-
tration (Greenfeld, 1992, see also: Adriano, 2015;
Blumberg, 1993; Ferran, 1999; Robé, 2011). It owns
assets and partakes in contracts in markets but
strictly understood, a corporation cannot be ‘multi-
national’ at all. The ‘multinational corporation,’
otherwise known as ‘transnational corporation’, is
not a legal person. As such, it cannot own things,
partake in contracts or indeed, pay tax (Blumberg,
1993; Hadari, 1973; Orts, 2013; Robé, 2011). The
MNE is de facto a network of corporate entities,
each of which enters into contractual relationships
with other corporate persons within and outside
the group. Group subsidiaries are supposed to trade
with one another at ‘arms-length’ principle – a
point, interestingly, well understood and previ-
ously discussed by prominent economists (Buckley
et al., 2015; Demsetz, 1997; Fama, 1980; Penrose,
2009).
However, the economic concept of the MNE has
largely eclipsed the implications of the legal status
of the corporation in (corporate/business) litera-
ture. The legal fiction of the independence of
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corporate subsidiaries, notes Eicke, ‘is not consis-
tent with the business point of view, which regards
a group of companies as one economic unity’
(Eicke, 2009: 53). Taking a unitary approach to
MNEs, a business perspective tends to gloss over the
fact that maximizing shareholder values encour-
ages micromanagement of every aspect of the
enterprise: from strategic planning, anticipating
tax impacts across time for all parties affected,
negotiating the most advantageous arrangement
and transforming the tax treatment of items to the
most favourable status (Karayan et al., 2002). The
legal organization of the group, which involves
strategic tax planning, is an essential dimension of
competitive business enterprise in today’s world.
The starting point of strategic tax planning accord-
ing to Rolfe Eicke, is the law itself, as ‘it is the main
driver, since it creates planning opportunities with
its wordings, is systematic inconsistencies and in
particular with its omissions’ (Eicke, 2009: 11). This
is a point that seems to have been lost despite ‘the
abundance of riches’ (Robé, 2011: 6) in the theo-
rizing of the firm in the past five decades.
Modern theories of the firm produced, in fact, no
dearth of opportunities for further investigation of
the techniques of legal portioning, sequencing and
corporate arbitrage. For example, one stream of
thought, often described as the neoclassical trans-
action cost approach, pays great attention to tax-
ation as costs on a par with transport costs
(Niehans, 1989). One would expect economists to
pay greater attention to the techniques that are
used to minimize those costs. Unfortunately, as
Douglas Allen notes, a narrow focus on costs that
occur between firms from the process of market
exchange ‘seems to be the reason why the neoclas-
sical approach never analyses questions of eco-
nomic organization outside of the choice of
medium of exchange’ (Allen, 2005: 906).
A potentially more promising avenue was forged
with the development of the property rights
approach or the firm as a web of contracts (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In
contrast to neoclassical theory, the property rights
approach is explicitly concerned with the qualita-
tive institutional analysis and the internal struc-
tural organization of firms (Simon, 1978;
Williamson, 1991), the latter seen as a special case
of a distribution of property rights. Law of contract,
and allocation of property rights within the firm
have also been subjects of considerable discussion
(see in particular (Simon, 1978; Williamson, 2005,
1999, 1991). Grossman and Hart develop a model
of the cost and benefit of internalizing corporate
entities (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) discuss corporate equity structure.
Countless studies are employing Knightian uncer-
tainty principles to organization (Boudreaux and
Holcombe, 1989). Terminology, however, can be
confusing. The concepts of ‘qualitative institu-
tional analysis’ or ‘discrete structural alternatives’
have a very different meaning in law, referring to
the type, location and distribution of corporate
legal person both in jurisdictions, and along the
internal topography of the firm. In economics, in
contrast, concepts such as ‘structural alternatives’,
‘organizational design’, or ‘qualitative institutional
analysis’ relate either to typologies of market/
hierarchy forms, or to the economics of corporate
holdings (subsidiary versus joint ventures and the
like), and do not involve the concrete legal organi-
zation of the firm and choice of corporate person-
ality (Demsetz, 1997).
A third stream of opportunity (lost) is associated
more closely with new institutionalism. This tradi-
tion treats firms as ‘problem-solving institutions’
(Demsetz, 1988: 141) operating under the con-
straining institutional environments which are ‘the
rules of the game in society’ (North, 1990: 3).
Driven by competitive strategic considerations,
internationalizing firms multiply the number and
variety of institutional constraints under which
they must operate, as each host country imposes its
own formal and informal rules of the game. Much
of the economic literature seems to have taken the
view, implicitly and without providing much evi-
dence, that the structuring of internal investments
through the use of the corporate legal person,
including a myriad of special purpose vehicles, is
mainly or exclusively concerned with minimizing
‘friction’ caused by different regulatory environ-
ments (Welch and Welch, 1996; Atwood et al.,
2012; Adriano, 2015). The role that tax considera-
tions play in the organization of the firm sub-
sidiaries, both domestically and internationally, is
simply ignored.
The fourth stream of theory derives directly from
the empirical and theoretical studies in IB, stressing
the concepts of risk and uncertainty as important
factors in corporate planning (Welch and Welch,
1996; Buckley and Ghauri, 1999; Cohen, 2007). It is
not uncommon for IB literature to refer to the legal
foundations of modern MNEs (Cohen, 2007: 28).
Furthermore, it is well understood that manage-
ment would seek to plan for future eventualities,
anticipating environmental hazards, including
Offshore financial centres Richard Phillips et al.
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political, institutional and economic risks, to create
– if possible – a stable investment environment.
However, what is ignored is the way by which the
legal structure of the organization is used to address
and anticipate a myriad environmental risks,
including political risk, and put in place years,
sometimes decades, in advance.
International Tax Implications
In any of the above streams, we come close to a
discussion of the legal organization of the firm, or
at least we could see the discussion factoring into
the legal structure of firms with a little additional
push. The push, however, appears never to have
come. The general focus remains on the firm as a
singular unit. This is correct to the extent that
management takes a holistic view of the group’s
strategies and tactics. However, some important
cost factors, in particular taxation, are handled by
management, as we argued above, at the level of
the subsidiary.
Publicly traded groups present consolidated
accounts for the entire group and provide a
group-level view of taxes owed and taxes paid. But
each corporate entity in the group, including the
Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) or subsidiaries
located in the same country, is considered an
independent taxpayer (Ferran, 1999).3 Subsidiaries
registered in a zero-tax jurisdiction such as the
Cayman Islands or Bermuda pay no corporate tax,
whereas subsidiaries of the same group registered in
an OECD country may end up paying in excess of
30% corporate tax. The system of international
business taxation incentivizes management to
apportion as many taxable activities to low-tax
jurisdictions as possible. They do so by rerouting
passive investments through their low-tax jurisdic-
tion subsidiaries (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995;
Dowd et al., 2017; Forte, 2016).
In a hypothetical case of ‘transfer pricing’, an
American beverage company would set up an
intermediating corporate entity in a low- or zero-
tax jurisdiction such as the Cayman Islands or
Bermuda and transfer the logo rights and trade-
marks to that entity. The low-/zero-tax jurisdiction-
based subsidiary would then charge enormous fees
for the right to use the firms’ logo to its French
subsidiary selling the beverage in France. Because of
large payments for the right to use the logo, the
French subsidiary would show little or no profits
and hence pay little tax. This makes the Bermudan
subsidiary, typically with few or no employees,
highly profitable while paying little or no tax in the
OFC. There is by now vast literature on the
relatively simple techniques of profit shifting
through transfer pricing that involve mispricing
and other fairly straightforward transfer pricing
schemes (Greggi, 2019; Grubert and Mutti, 1991;
US Department of the Treasury, 2016). Following a
considerable tightening of regulations in the past
decades, such techniques of tax mitigation are now
far more difficult to justify and implement. Modern
MNEs, on the whole, prefer to deploy far more
sophisticated methods of tax mitigation exploiting
and arbitraging inconsistent national rules to their
advantage (Eicke, 2009).
Tax experts believe that intermediating holding
companies, particularly those located in an off-
shore financial centre (OFC), are an ideal tool of
corporate tax planning (Avi-Yonah et al., 2008;
Dorfmüller et al., 2006; Eicke, 2009; Nakamoto
et al., 2019; Panayi, 2013). Holding companies can
be used for treaty exemption shopping or deferral
shopping, transforming non-exempt profits into
exempted (or deferred) profits; they can be used for
rule shopping, transforming dividend income into
other accounting categories such as interest pay-
ment; they can be used for tax rate shopping, i.e.
transferring income to low-tax jurisdictions and
similar techniques (Eicke, 2009). One popular
technique of arbitrage using such intermediary
holding companies exploits diverging legal rules
regarding corporate nexus for taxation purposes.
The concept of nexus for state taxation purposes
requires that corporations have what the legislature
deems as ‘sufficient contact’ with the state for that
state to tax it (Brossart, 2010). However, what is
considered sufficient contact can vary from one
state to the next (Brossart, 2010). This tactic was
reported by the US Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigation of the Apple group. According to the
Subcommittee, Apple Inc. exploited diverging Irish
and U.S. nexus rules to reduce its corporate tax bill
significantly (Levin et al., 2013; European Commis-
sion 2016.). It set up a regional treasury hub in
Ireland supposedly in control of all of Apple’s
operations outside the American continent. But
some of Apple’s Irish subsidiaries did not meet
Ireland’s threshold of nexus rules by establishing
their tax residency in Ireland (European Commis-
sion, 2016: 2.1.2, 45), nor were these entities tax
resident in the US either. These subsidiaries accu-
mulated considerable earnings from the sale of
Apple hardware and software in foreign markets.
Since these corporate entities were not tax resident
in Ireland nor in the US, they had no effective tax
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residency and hence were not required to pay tax.
The Levine Committee and the EU Commission
both concluded that Apple’s complex arrangement
with its Irish SPVs could be classified as a tax
avoidance scheme – Apple and the Irish govern-
ment deny the charge and won an appeal to the
European Court of Justice.
Apple is not alone in making use of diverging
national tax rules. There are other revelations of the
complex and sophisticated tax planning schemes
adopted by some well-known American software
companies using ‘operations centres’ in Ireland or
the Netherlands to arbitrage using the United
States’ Controlled Foreign Company rules (CFC)
(Coyle, 2017; Loomis, 2011). They include the
infamous ‘Double Irish’, ‘Dutch Sandwich’ or ‘Dou-
ble Irish, Single Malt’ (Loomis, 2011; Kelly, 2015;
Coyle, 2017). American IT companies took advan-
tage of a loophole in the complex US transfer
pricing rules to set up such intermediary holdings
in OFC jurisdictions. Although Code Section 367 of
the CFC rules applies to cross-border transfers of
the intangible property embedded within a soft-
ware program, it does not apply to the develop-
ment of intangible assets by a foreign affiliate
outside the United States. This loophole is
exploited by a parent company entering into a
‘cost-sharing arrangement’ with a foreign sub-
sidiary of the same group for updates of software
products (Darby and Lemaster, 2007: 12). A leak
from the Luxembourg branch of the accounting
firm PricewaterhouseCoopers revealed complex
financial structures intended to exploit jurisdic-
tional tax mismatches that allowed companies to
avoid taxes both in Luxembourg and elsewhere
through the use of so-called hybrid loans (Marian,
2013). There are many other known cases of hybrid
mismatch arrangements that are taking advantage
of diverging national rules and regulations (Johan-
nesen, 2014; OECD, 2012).
These schemes are strictly legal and hence are
classified as tax avoidance. This arbitrage exploits
differences in the tax treatment of an entity or
instrument under the laws of two or more countries
to achieve double non-taxation of all partial or
complete deferral (Nessy and Rahayu, 2019: 149).
The numbers involved are not trivial. It is estimated
that US firms alone have amassed between US$1.9
to 3.0 trillion in cash or near-cash deposits
‘trapped’, as Reuven Avi-Yonah puts it, in OFCs
(Atwood et al., 2012; Avi-Yonah, 2019; Clausing,
2016; Dowd et al., 2017; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009;
Hines, 1988; Kaye, 2014; Miller, 2011; Phillips
et al., 2017; Tørsløv et al., 2018). Researchers at
the IMF came up with the startling figures that
about 30% of all foreign direct investments are
‘phantom investments’ operating through shell
corporations (Damgaard et al., 2019).
The practice of tax arbitrage through hybrid
mismatch and corporate tax gaming has been
public and discussed for some time (Avi-Yonah,
2005; Graetz, 2016), though only in the last decade
has the phenomenon attracted serious attention.
The OECD, UNCTAD, and different EU bodies have
done a great job in collating and presenting various
trans-border arbitraging schemes (OECD, 2013a;
TAXUD, 2018; UNCTAD, 2016). Although each
known scheme is highly sophisticated and tailored
to very specific conditions or sectors, they have
certain common features. First, these schemes
invariably consist of specific parent–subsidiary
equity arrangements among affiliated members of
a group, where the totality of these arrangements
represents the legal structure of the firm (HM
Treasury, 2014; UNCTAD, 2016). Second, as Apple
and similar cases show, the single most important
factor in such sophisticated hybrid mismatch tax
avoidance schemes is not the precise function of
those singular entities in the corporate ecology, but
their ability, in combination with other sub-
sidiaries, to arbitrage between third-country tax
rules. Third, hybrid mismatch arrangements use an
intermediary corporate entity in a third country
contributing to the ‘deepening’ of the corporate
organization, through sequencing and partitioning
layers of intermediating corporate persons operat-
ing in OFC jurisdictions. Fourth, the better-known
cases of arbitrage invariably implicate intermediat-
ing offshore-registered corporate entities. Often,
these are usually not the traditional low-tax juris-
dictions in island states, but a class of jurisdictions
scoring highly on the Tax Justice Network’s corpo-
rate tax havens index (TJN, 2019). They include the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Ireland, and Cyprus, all of which are
actively seeking to attract regional holding compa-
nies (Polak, 2010).
Related Research Challenges
Whereas some broad characteristics of corporate
arbitraging structures are known, such transfers are
difficult to detect in a MNE’s consolidated
accounts. Firms rarely volunteer information on
their corporate equity arrangement, let alone their
subsidiary structures. Group corporate ecologies
comprise of legal persons often numbering in the
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hundreds or even thousands. Current regulations
do not require global firms to divulge their consti-
tutive legal structures, let alone make their corpo-
rate ‘step books’ available to the public or to
regulatory bodies.4 Many do not list any of their
subsidiaries below a certain threshold (Flower,
2016; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Meek et al., 1995),
and consider any information on the precise moti-
vation for the establishment of corporate sub-
sidiaries, including OFC-registered subsidiaries,
commercial secrets that must be kept for reasons
of competition. To date, there are no credible
methods for identifying or even providing rough
estimates of the size of the phenomenon of tax
jurisdiction arbitrage.
One (underdeveloped) approach in comparative
macroeconomic analysis of profit shifting centres
focuses on the number of intermediating compa-
nies in groups (Desai et al., 2006). The more
common approach, however, focuses on the num-
ber and location of OFC-registered subsidiaries of
corporate groups for the simple reason that these
jurisdictions levy either low or zero corporate taxes
on entities registered in their territories. These data,
compiled in the Orbis database, are extensively
used by researchers to identify and collate the
number of OFC subsidiary entities of corporate
groups (Cobham and Janský, 2018; Haberly and
Wójcik, 2015; Hines, 1988; Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2015; Ribeiro, et al., 2010; Zucman, 2015). Among
those, two studies have sought to analyse micro-
data data relating to OFC-based intermediaries
(Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017a; Nakamoto et al.,
2019). Economists and economic geographers have
developed sophisticated triangulation techniques
to calculate the global impact of corporate profit
shifting (Clausing, 2016; Cobham and Janský,
2018; Dowd et al., 2017; Garcia-Bernardo et al.,
2017b; Gordon, 2016; Gumpert et al., 2016; Hines,
1988; Hines and Rice, 1994; Kaye, 2014; Phillips
et al., 2017; Tørsløv et al., 2018).
The problem with these approaches is that not all
OFC-registered corporate entities are set up as part
of tax planning schemes.5 Furthermore, even
among those that are set up for tax purposes, only
those located on a chain of subsidiaries can support
jurisdictional arbitrage. The problem is com-
pounded because arbitraging structures take advan-
tage of loopholes and blind spots that arise by
arbitraging two or more corporate entities in two or
more jurisdictions, hence data on the OFC corpo-
rate entities may not reveal the full extent of the
effects on arbitrage.
Our approach to this multifaceted set of chal-
lenges has three components: First, we introduce
improvements to the techniques of mapping the
MNE parent–subsidiary equity arrangements. These
improvements allow us to account for the corpo-
rate entity arrangements of entire groups, spanning
thousands of non-financial MNEs. Second, we
narrow the research of OFC-registered subsidiaries
to a specific type of entities, specifically intermedi-
ating OFC entities, which are traceable in our novel
equity maps. Third, we partially overcome data
problems associated with OFC-registered entities by
focusing specifically on the more-readily available
data that is emanating from the ‘onshore’-regis-
tered subsidiaries linked to the OFC in-betweeners
and therefore part of their arbitrage structure,
should there be one.
The following section sets up the sequence of
steps we took to provide the first estimates of the
size and scale of the phenomenon of jurisdictional
arbitrage.
AN EQUITY-MAPPING APPROACH TO
ANALYSING INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE
ABILITY IN MNES
Data on MNE Subsidiary Ownership and Control
The concept of jurisdictional arbitrage refers to
‘corporate structures,’ that is two or more corporate
entities, embedded in the MNE’s ecology, orga-
nized to exploit gaps, loopholes and blind spots in
national regulations in order to lower overall
corporate taxation. Understanding arbitrage begins
with an analysis of the legal structure of firms. The
legal structure of firms refers to the organization of
corporate holdings and the construction of corpo-
rate groups with legal tools including agency,
contract and property rights (Blumberg, 1993;
Ferran, 1999; Orts, 2013; Robé, 2011). Historically,
analysis of ownership patterns has been concerned
with shareholder control and its impact on perfor-
mance and efficiency (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera,
2016; Chen et al., 2014; Daily and Dollinger, 1992;
Powell and Rhee, 2016; Titman, 2017). In contrast,
research on the internal corporate architecture of
MNEs is in its infancy (Lewellen and Robinson,
2013; UNCTAD, 2015).6
The Orbis database, which contains data from the
filing of corporate subsidiaries, is the starting point
for our data analysis. We convert the ownership
data of multinational and subsidiary organizations
provided by Orbis into an equity map of corporate
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groups using a standard social network (SNA)
approach. The structure of information that is
described in social network analysis is usually
constructed as an ‘adjacency matrix,’ whereby for
every node in the graph, the immediate relation-
ships with other nodes are defined. A sequence of
adjacent nodes in a graph forms a ‘path’. A
sequence that never revisits an edge is called a
‘trail’. In turn, a ‘walk’ is any sequence of adjacent
nodes. Every path is a trail, and every trail is a walk
(Borgatti et al., 2013; Kurt and Kurt, 2020). SNA
uses computer algorithms to ‘walk’ through the
sequential paths in the matrix most efficiently. A
‘walking’ algorithm establishes immediate connec-
tions from one node (the GUO subsidiary), in our
case information on ownership patterns filed by
each SCE and provided by Orbis, and then follow-
ing the sequence of connections in subsequent
nodes in a series of iterations.
The Orbis data are far from perfect (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2015; Ribeiro, et al., 2010) and requires
extensive ‘cleaning’ to verify the precise location of
subsidiaries on a corporate chain. Orbis’ database
provides ownership relationship data between sub-
sidiaries in a group in two distinct sets of reporting
categories: direct ownership levels, and total own-
ership levels. The data may describe a reporting
relationship where corporate entity ‘A’ owns cor-
porate ‘B’ directly, and corporate ‘B’ owns corporate
‘C’ directly. However, it may also contain informa-
tion about corporate ‘A’ as owning corporate ‘C’
indirectly, therefore misrepresenting the reported
total level of ownership (seen below in Figure 1).
Over thousands of links between entities on
lengthy ownership chains within a group network,
such misrepresentations aggregate and can com-
pletely distort information about a corporate
group. Hence, we clean the data to minimize the
level of indirect relationships to only those cases
where there is no other direct information avail-
able, preserving where relevant the level of total
ownership.7 Additionally, we introduce a control
measure to find out how long a particular entity has
been part of the group within a given configuration
of entities, using the accounting years that pertain
to the period where there is evidence to confirm the
current arrangement in a chain. This is to ensure
that no assumptions are made that would include
corporate entities and their accounts that were not
in fact part of the MNE group during the entire
period.
To visualize such equity maps, we use a force-tree
algorithm that captures an equity map whole.
Force-directed layout algorithms produce graph
drawings using social ‘gravity’ as an additional
force in force-directed layouts, together with a
scaling technique (Perlman, 1985; Tamassia,
2013). Figure 2 is an example of the resulting
graph.
Each dot in Figure 2 represents one subsidiary of
the group. The red dot at the centre is the global
ultimate owner. The GUO controls some sub-
sidiaries directly, and some indirectly, through a
chain of subsidiaries. Directly controlled sub-
sidiaries who, in turn, do not control under
subsidiaries, appear graphically near the parent,
many forming a cluster. The algorithm pulls the
controlled subsidiary down a chain further away
from parent, and so a chain of subsidiaries in
revealed. Some of those chains reveal a secondary
clustering. These clusters may either represent
functional divisions in group, different ‘brand’ (as
for instance, the Audi brand of Volkswagen would
typically be represented as a branch of its own, with
some clustering around Audi’s central holding
company). The equity map reveals that this auto-
mobile firm consists of several organizations (or
clusters). The GUO tends to control these clusters
through intermediate holding companies, often
organised through a chain of subsidiaries. Many
of these clusters in turn have their own sub-clusters
and all seem to control independent subsidiaries.
The result is an ‘equity map’ and provides unique
visualization of the relationship and degree of
connection between MNE subsidiaries.
As discussed previously, arbitraging structures,
such as the one deployed by Apple, or various types
of hybrid structures revealed by OECD’s BEPS
studies and by independent researchers, involve a
chain of subsidiaries, whereby at least one of the
intermediary subsidiaries is located in an OFC
jurisdiction. The majority of such structures have
their intermediaries located in non-traditional
OFCs (Cobham and Janský, 2018; Garcia-Bernardo
et al., 2017a; Haberly and Wójcik, 2015). We
propose, therefore, to narrow our search to only
A B C
Figure 1 Direct and indirect ownership pattern.
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OFC-registered subsidiaries that serve as intermedi-
ating entities.
Identifying Stand-Alone Versus In-Betweener
MNE Subsidiaries
We differentiate OFC-registered subsidiaries along
with their topographical location on corporate
chains. Some OFC subsidiaries control no other
subsidiaries of the group and form a kind of
subsidiary dead end. They constitute stand-alone
subsidiaries and would have the following (On –
(On –On-On) … Off) signature (Figure 3 below).
These entities undoubtedly take advantage of the
regulatory environment of their OFC location,
including low taxation, but due to their location
on corporate chains, they cannot be used for tax
arbitraging purposes. One theory is that MNEs
probably employ those type of corporate entities
in ‘tax neutral’ venues to perform a variety of
financial and treasury operations, such as funding,
hedging, forex and the like (Chorafas, 1992;
Dizkırıcı, 2012; Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
2016; Polak, 2010; Stewart, 2005). As stand-alones,
any profits they generate would be subject to
taxation once they are repatriated to the parent. If
this theory is correct, then the tax savvy MNE
would ensure that the majority of its stand-alone
OFC subsidiaries would have little or no operating
revenues or net income, or alternatively be located
under another OFC subsidiary (‘in-betweeners’), or
possibly use derivative instruments to reallocate
those profits (Clappers and Mac-Lean, 2019; Office,
2011; Schizer, 1999).
Other OFC subsidiaries are in control of further
subsidiaries downstream on a chain of subsidiaries.
These OFC subsidiaries are ‘in-betweeners,’ in con-
trol of one or more ‘on-shore’ subsidiaries. Their
signature on the corporate chain is (On – (On –Off -
On) … On). It is likely that most OFC subsidiaries
are set up in part to take advantage of low taxes or
other unique regulatory incentives offered by OFCs,
but only the second type, in-betweeners, can serve,
in addition, sophisticated arbitrating purposes
(Clark et al., 2015; Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017a;
Zucman, 2014). Stand-alone OFC subsidiaries are
not intermediating subsidiaries and therefore unli-
kely to be a component of arbitrating structures,
whereas an in-between subsidiary could potentially
serve such purposes because their location on the
Figure 2 An equity map of a global automobile firm manufacturer, mid-2018.
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corporate chains can affect the relationship among
subsidiaries in a group.
We collected, cleaned and sorted data points
from Orbis for the top 100 non-financial multina-
tional enterprises globally in operating revenues in
2018. Our analysis goes as far as ten subsidiaries
deep into the network per firm (see Online
Appendix A). To narrow our search into in-between
structures, we first generated a list of OFC jurisdic-
tions. Our list of OFCs is based on the Tax Justice
Network’s financial secrecy index (TJN, 2018),
combined with the top 10 jurisdictions on the
Tax Justice Network’s Corporate Tax Havens Index
(TJN, 2019). We introduced an additional filter to
account only for OFC subsidiaries that control
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. A Dutch holding
company that controls other Dutch companies
may service the local market and hence potentially
is not part of a Netherlands offshore financial
centre arbitrage structure. Simply put, when there
is a clear reason for an intermediating entity to be
in said jurisdiction, it does not count as an in-
between entity. We therefore exclude such Dutch
holdings from our list of OFCs (see Online
Appendix B for discussion of the list of OFCs).
We then separated each group’s OFC-registered
entities along those who report controlling other
subsidiaries in the group (in-betweeners) and those
that do not (stand-alones). This gave us a list of
type 1 (stand-alones) and type 2 (in-betweeners)
OFC-based subsidiaries held by each of the top 100
non-financial firms in the world in 2018. Column J
in Online Appendix A presents the number of
‘standalones’ for each of the top 100 non-financial
firms, and column O the number of ‘in-betweeners’
they have set up respectively. It appears to us that
both for practical and for policy reasons, the exact
number of type 2 subsidiaries that might facilitate
jurisdictional arbitrage is less significant. We
assume that as with Apple Inc., tax-oriented arbi-
trating ‘in-betweeners’ are likely to be placed in
control over a substantial portion of the group’s
operating revenues and net income. It is the
portion of a group’s overall operating revenues
and net income placed under the ‘control’ of such
OFC entities that matter.
For example, a firm may only have one such
chain in its group network but place, say, 70% of its
overall revenue streams underneath it, whereas
another has set up dozens but none of them
control more than a few percent of revenues. The
greater the portion of the group’s operating rev-
enues and net income that is placed under ‘in-
betweener’ control, the greater is the opportunity
for tax arbitrage created by the group. The reason
being that corporate entities on such chains have
rights over the underlying financial assets and the
cash flows that derive from entities down the chain.
The manifestations of those rights are linked to
jurisdictional rules of the intermediating entity,
which are governing rights of ownership, utiliza-
tion, and financial transactions.
To conclude: we are less interested in finding the
number of subsidiaries controlled through ‘in-
Figure 3 A stylized organization of affiliated groups, including two types of offshore entities.
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betweener’ subsidiaries. We correlate instead the
mapping exercise with financial data derived from
the filing of individual subsidiaries to find out, first,
the portion of the entire group’s operating revenues
and profits controlled by such structures and
second, whether or not those ‘in-betweeners’
diverge noticeably from other OFC-registered
subsidiaries.
Other Equity-Mapping Steps
To answer these questions meaningfully, we had to
introduce another set of controls. Intra-group
transactions may be highly episodic or recurring.
To account for episodic oscillation, we take an
average from the most recent 5-year period for
which there is likely to be the best quality data. As
of June 2018, this presents the financial years 2012-
2016 (e.g. filing information for FY 2016 occurring
in the calendar year 2017, the most recent year for
which we could expect relative completeness of
data. As discussed above, this means we cross-
checked to make sure any entities we include from
our 2018 sample can be traced back as part of the
group accordingly). This entails both a considera-
tion of (A) the relative size of nominal unconsol-
idated accounting values, relative to those offered
by the consolidated GUO parent, and (B) the
relation to the total value observable from all listed
subsidiaries within the entire group. As context-
specificity within a group can play a major role in
influencing the amounts that it would be ‘normal’
to see in the accounting data, our investigation
begins with a distributional overview to help
calibrate what is ‘normal’ as opposed to ‘excep-
tional’ in the reporting of accounting values by
private unconsolidated subsidiaries.
In summary, the results presented here (see
Online Appendix A) refer therefore only to entities
that meet the following research conditions:
1. They are majority or wholly owned as of June
2018, which is C 50% ownership relative to the
parent GUO entity.
2. They are currently held in a particular structural
arrangement we can detect and classify.
3. Only the accounting years for which we can
confirm from the GUO that they were owned at
the requisite threshold are considered, or if an
indirect report by the GUO is not available, the
maximum period that shareholder records can
confirm that the current chain of equity hold-
ings has been in place.
The combined effect of these mitigating mea-
sures is giving our estimations a highly conserva-
tive bias because restructuring within a group over
time may have occurred. However, it is essential to
guard against inflated historical values derived
fromM&A activities. Therefore, shareholder history
information is very important for our method.
FINDINGS FROM EQUITY MAPPING
Preliminary Matters
Having resolved the location issue of ‘in-between-
ers’, we encountered additional complicating fac-
tors important to discuss here before we turn to our
main findings, detailed in Online Appendix A. One
serious issue in comparative research using equity
mapping is coverage: the Orbis database does not
provide full accounting information on every sub-
sidiary in a group. This is particularly the case
regarding OFC-registered subsidiaries. Some of
these data issues can be overcome because data
from ‘onshore’ jurisdictions controlled by those ‘in-
betweeners’ tend to be of higher quality. We can
tell therefore in principle the value of operating
revenues and net income generated collectively by
entities under the control of in-betweeners and
compare it with the MNE group’s consolidated data
to find the portion of the group’s overall operating
revenues and net income located under the control
of those in-betweeners.
To give one example, when data provided by
each subsidiary are aggregated, then in the case of
the Walmart group with an annual turnover of
US$500 billion, we can account for only 22.64% of
the parent’s operating revenues and 22.98% of the
parent’s net income as a percentage of the parents’
consolidated accounts. The fourth largest group,
the Toyota Motor Corp., with $US240 billion in
annual turnover, totalling up all the ‘visible’
corporate subsidiary accounts amounts to 76.84%,
and 42.86% of the group’s reported consolidated
operating revenues and net income. The rest are
located presumably in entities that either do not
file annual accounts, or in entities where their
filings are not made available publicly. We there-
fore provide a ‘visibility’ index for each group and
each accounting categories. The index tells us the
portion of the consolidated figures (for each
accounting category) that is ‘visible’ (that is, avail-
able on Orbis). We consider a visibility index
figure of less than 50% too low to support mean-
ingful interpretation.
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The visibility index raises an additional compli-
cating factor. For instance, the visibility index
shows that we can account on Orbis for 110.4%
of Royal Dutch’s operating revenues and 776.06%
of its net income. This is not a one-off anomaly. We
can account for 101.01% of Volkswagen’s operating
revenue and - 46.92% of the groups’ net income.
In other words, even with limited ‘visibility,’
aggregated figures from subsidiaries may reach
above 100% of the group’s reported consolidated
figure for the same accounting categories. Such
anomalies arise out of the system of consolidated
accounting that is used by these groups. Consoli-
dated accounts are guided by a complex set of
accounting rules and guidelines as instructed by the
GUO’s home country (Rosenbloom, 2002). Consid-
ering that most firms would include a degree of
intra-firm transfers of operating revenues and/or
net income in their filings, aggregated operating
revenues or net income can reach above 100% of
the value declared by the GUO in the same
accounting categories as is the case of Royal Dutch
Shell and Volkswagen. Indeed, 31 firms in our
sample return a 100% or above visibility index for
their operating revenues accounting category.
Those firms appear to be engaged in higher-than-
average intra-group transfers. Whereas the accounts
imply that a group like Volkswagen, for instance,
generates most of its net income in entities that are
‘invisible’ on Orbis.
The visibility index compares, in other words,
what may be described as a ‘pre-consolidated value’,
or aggregated values generated at the entity level,
which we then compare with the reported consol-
idated accounts. There is, as far as we can tell, no
known standard for a normal rate of intra-firm
transfers and hence no benchmark against that one
can compare pre-consolidation indexes among
MNEs. However, as far as we can tell, in the
majority of the cases, the pre-consolidation values
and invisibility index do not detract from reaching
certain conclusions about the MNEs’ behaviour. Let
us take the example of the 8th group on our list,
Exxon Mobil Corp., with an annual turnover of
US$237 billion a year within which 57.04% of
operating revenues and 60.5% of net income is
‘visible.’ Although the group has established 58
stand-alone offshore entities, combined, they pre-
sent 0% of the ‘visible’ operating revenues and net
income of the group; yet 35.84% of its ‘visible’
operating revenues and 34.12% of visible net
income is placed under the control of its in-
betweeners (Exxon maintains a relatively high ‘in-
betweeners’ count of 30). Considering that we can
observe overall only 57.04% of the group’s operat-
ing revenues and 60.5% of net income, of those,
62.79% (column Q) and 57.17% (column S) respec-
tively, are placed under the control of ‘in-between-
ers.’ Such figures are substantial enough, we argue,
to warrant an informed interpretation of the firm’s
behaviour.
Again, as with the visibility index, the cut-off line
is an artificial line we chose within our research
design and not based on existing industry regula-
tions, but we consider any figure above 50% pre-
consolidation to offer a reasonable level of ‘visibil-
ity.’ Second and related, we had to ask what the ‘pre-
consolidated value’ above which the figures will be
considered sufficient to warrant meaningful inter-
pretation is. Again, we believe that a figure of 50%
represents a reasonable level of pre-consolidated
value to sustain an interpretation. We consider,
therefore, only cases that comply with the follow-
ing criteria to be sufficiently robust:
1. The nominal value of the pre-consolidation
index for a subgroup must be greater than 50%
of the consolidated value reported by the parent.
2. The nominal value of the pre-consolidation
index for a subgroup must be greater than 50%
of the total of observable values reported from all
subsidiaries in the group.
3. The pre-consolidation index value for all sub-
sidiaries must itself be greater than the median
level reported from across the 100-firms sample.
These criteria are conservative by design. They
limit the total incidence rate of positive identifica-
tions to only half of the corporate groups. This is to
limit considerations to only cases where there is an
‘above average’ level of reporting: and thus to only
those cases in which we are most able to isolate
where in the corporate group most of the account-
ing values reported publicly by the parent company
will likely come from. Only in these cases do we
then concern ourselves with testing the further
question of whether the unconsolidated account-
ing values reach magnitudes that would suggest
most value reported by the parent is attributable to
a particular subset of subsidiaries.
Main Findings
We now turn to our main findings, which are listed
in detail in Online Appendix A and also discussed
and summarized in the text and series of figures be-
low as well as in the conclusion.
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The top 100 non-financial firms have established
between them 73,864 subsidiaries as of 2018.
Among these, 6219 (or nearly 8.4% of the sub-
sidiary corporate entities of the top 100 non-
financial firms in the world) were located in OFC
jurisdictions. Most of the firms in our sample, 84%
to be exact, have established many more ‘stand-
alone’ OFC entities than ‘in-betweeners’. We
exclude the cases were an OFC holding controls
another entity in the same jurisdictions (as
described in Online Appendix B, because these
may serve the local market). Once those entities are
excluded, the number of OFC subsidiaries held by
the top 100 non-financial firms stands at 4371, or
nearly 6.4% of the total, of which 3014 (or about
4%) are ‘stand-alones’ while 1257 (or 1.7%) are in-
betweeners.
Those 1.7% ‘in-betweeners’ were overall ‘in con-
trol’ of 6208 subsidiaries in chains below them
within the MNE’s subsidiary network structure. In
other words, nearly 8.4% of the subsidiaries of the
top 100 non-financial firms were controlled by ‘in-
betweeners.’ Quite a few firms in our sample set up
only one or two ‘in-betweeners,’ and placed them
in control of a negligent portion of the group’s
revenue. However, overall, the median scale of pre-
consolidated index value for in-betweener entities
for those 8.4% entities has been 66% of operating
revenues and 40% of net income of the entire MNE
group’s overall operating revenues and net income
(see Figures 4 and 5).
Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 present the distribution
of descriptive results for all 100 non-financial
corporate groups in the study. Results are presented
as a box-whisker plot which describes the median,
the inner quartile range (IQR) and outliers within a
distribution. The IQR is the difference between the
first and third quartile or the central 50% of
observations (the coloured rectangle in each fig-
ure). The whiskers describe the extent of other
observed values that are not statistical non-outliers.
Outliers appear as dots. Black dots are defined as
values more than 1.5 times the standard deviation.
Extreme outliers appear as clear dots and are
defined as values more than three times the stan-
dard deviation. In Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, results
describe the value of the financial reporting on net
income or operating revenues for either the subset
of subsidiaries held by in-betweener OFCs or stand-
alone OFCs themselves. These values were calcu-
lated by aggregating the historical reporting avail-
able for the subsidiaries in question and expressing
those values as a percentage of the same values
being reported by the respective parent’s consoli-
dated (total) over the same 5-year period. Figure 8
in turn presents the same calculations but for all























Figure 5 In-betweener OFCs and their subsidiary holdings: 5-
























Figure 4 In-betweener OFCs and their subsidiary holdings: 5-
year mean of operating revenues (2012–2016).
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In light of the complicating factors with the data
discussed in the previous section, column T in
Online Appendix A identifies those firms where
evidence best suggests that the majority (i.e. greater
than 50%) of either the parent’s operating income
or net income is placed under the control of
subsidiaries incorporated in OFC jurisdictions. We
applied this test for stand-alones and in-between-
ers, and both operating income and net income
pre-consolidation index values. We indicate cases
where all three criteria were met as ‘true’ in Online
Appendix A, column T. The results were true for 24
of the MNEs in the top 100. These positive results
are cases where the majority of the MNE’s value is
controlled through OFC-based ‘in-betweener’ hold-
ing group structures. Given that we artificially
restricted our concerns to only half of the sample
where the data were best and most complete, and
that we then set our targets only in those cases
where most values in a group appear to be placed
under the control of OFC-based subsidiaries, the
results suggest an unexpectedly high rate of posi-
tive incidences (i.e. 48% of the total of positive
findings) when there might be many more were our
controls less stringent.
Considering that the literature on aggressive tax
planning has identified many ATP schemes that
have ‘in-betweeners’ among them, these findings
are not surprising. Yet they are worrying. They
show that, whether they make use of them or
intend to do so, many of the top 100 non-financial
firms have created what are in effect ‘opportunity
spaces’ for aggressive tax avoidance. Furthermore,
they have placed those structures strategically in
control of a considerable portion of the respective
group’s operating revenues and net income.
Additional Findings
The study focused on a specific set of structures
embedded in the corporate ecology that can serve
as ‘opportunity spaces’ for tax arbitrage. Beyond
those, our findings and data point to additional
issues that may warrant further research.
First, as mentioned above, most OFC-registered
subsidiaries are stand-alones. We found that in
nearly all observable cases, the pre-consolidated
value of stand-alone OFCs was a small fraction (less
than 10% and typically less than 5%) of the pre-
consolidated values under the control of ‘in-be-
tweeners’. The portfolio holdings of OFC entities
reveal median observations of only 0.26% and
0.08%, respectively (see Figures 5 and 6). The
majority (75%) of stand-alones registered a pre-
consolidated index that is equal to only 1% of the
consolidated parent. These findings come with an
important caveat that financial data on OFC-regis-
tered entities is generally poor. Yet, such a marked
difference between the values associated with
























Figure 6 Stand-alone OFCs: 5-year mean of operating revenues
(2012–2016).
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standalones and in-betweeners is too vast to be
dismissed. It suggests that as a group, the stand-
alones are unlikely to be engaged in significant
transfer pricing and may be used, as the literature
suggests, for specialized treasury operations func-
tions such as funding, investment vehicles, cash
holdings or hedging (Polak et al., 2011).
Secondly, despite the general impression of
growing transparency due to the tightening of
national and international regulations, the world of
corporate filings remains highly opaque. As we saw
above, there are nearly no available financial data
at the subsidiary level for around a dozen of our
cases (13% of the top 100 non-financial firms in the
world). Aggregation of subsidiary reporting of
operating revenues reaches values similar to the
consolidated reporting in less than 50% of those
companies. For the rest, considerable portions of
their operating revenues and net income are locked
in subsidiaries that are not required to file annual
accounts at all or are in jurisdictions that do not
reveal those accounts except possibly to their
national financial regulators.8 These findings cor-
relate with other in-depth studies of financial
transparency such as the financial secrecy index
2018 (FSI 2018) – suggesting that opacity is still rife.
Third, we note, as alluded to above, that pre-
consolidated indexes vary from one corporate
group to another, and furthermore that the pre-
consolidated indexes for operating revenues and
net income diverge across the board. The median
level of a pre-consolidated index of 66% of operat-
ing revenues compares with a pre-consolidated
index of only 32% for net income (Figures 7 and
8). The aggregated median operating revenues
reported by subsidiaries of the top 100 non-finan-
cial firms amount to 66% of the operating revenues
reported by the same groups in their consolidated
accounts. The median aggregate net income
reported by subsidiaries is only 32% of the reported
consolidated revenues of the same firms. Either
coincidentally or by intent, a greater portion of
these firms’ operating revenues is in jurisdictions
that make the filings available, compared to the
reported net income.
NOTES
One explanation for the divergence seen in the
above Figures 7 and 8 between the two values
across the board is that operating revenues are
likely to be generated in large market economies,
where annual filings are normally available (except
for the US, hence the median is less than 100%).
Whereas, according to the profit shifting literature,
a higher portion of profits is reported in OFCs,
which rarely make those filings available. This
finding seems to correlate broadly with the findings
of profit-shifting research.
An alternative explanation is that would-be
profit-shifting firms are likely to have a greater
interest in ensuring that a smaller portion of their
profits data are subject to public scrutiny as
opposed to their operating revenues, so the diver-
gence in median values for the two pre-consoli-
dated indexes may be significant. There could be
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but the size of our sample of the largest 100
industrial firms in the world is a strong sign that
opacity may not be distributed randomly. The
divergence in those pre-consolidated accounts is
unlikely to be coincidental and may be the product
of meticulous planning – a point that has not been
acknowledged, let alone discussed, so far in the
literature, but one merits additional research. The
implications are that when comparing those values
among groups, we are comparing apples with pears.
Yet, it is useful to know the extent to which
arbitrating structures are used among the group of
top 100 non-financial MNEs.
CONCLUSION
Central Research Aims and Key Findings
This paper presents the first comparative empirical
examination of the portion of a MNE group’s
operating revenues and net income controlled by
intermediating offshore subsidiaries (‘in-between-
ers’). Described sometimes as intermediating hold-
ing companies, tax experts suggest that such
structures offer a variety of opportunities for tax
arbitrage. To date, the scale of the phenomenon of
the use of those ‘in-betweener’ OFCs was unknown.
Our analysis suggests that about a quarter of OFC-
registered subsidiaries of large MNEs create the
conditions that facilitate tax arbitrage, or what we
call ‘opportunity spaces’ for tax arbitrage. Despite
their relatively low number, this study confirms
that at least among the top 100 non-financial, non-
state-owned global MNEs in the world, such struc-
tures are often placed in control of large propor-
tions of these groups’ operating revenues and net
income. The greater the portion of a group’s
operating revenues controlled by such structures,
the more opportunities they have for tax arbitrage.
We identify in Online Appendix A those firms that
are heavy users of such structures.
By differentiating OFC subsidiaries along their
topographical location on corporate chains, this
study is able to lend support, therefore, to the many
macroeconomic studies of profit shifting, but also,
paradoxically, to the often-heard argument that
OFC subsidiaries are used as ‘tax-neutral’ locations.
The majority of enterprises, the standalones,
undoubtedly benefit from the low-taxation envi-
ronment provided by an OFC. Simply counting the
number of OFC subsidiaries is mistaken. Under
rules of most countries, any tax savings produced
by those standalones is eliminated once funds are
repatriated to the parent. One theory is that MNEs
probably employ those types of corporate entities
in ‘tax-neutral’ venues to perform a variety of
financial and treasury operations, such as funding,
hedging, forex and the like. If the theory is correct,
then the majority of stand-alone OFC subsidiaries
would have little or no operating revenues or net
income – and that is exactly what this study found.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests,
therefore, that most probably the majority of
corporate OFCs are chosen for tax-neutrality rea-
sons, but a significant minority, those ‘in-between-
ers,’ play a different role in corporate planning and
are placed, therefore, in control of high proportions
of a group’s operating revenues, a position which
can be used for tax arbitrage.
Implications for IB and Related Policy Research
and Practice
This study demonstrates that a key factor deter-
mining tax arbitrage is not the amount of value
registered on OFC subsidiaries’ balance sheets, but
rather the portion of the group’s operating rev-
enues and net income controlled by OFC sub-
sidiaries. Policymakers and the academic
community should pay greater attention to the
organizational structure and layering of corporate
investment through diverse jurisdictions. There is
extensive literature discussing the economic, man-
agerial and normative foundations of location and
corporate investment (Welch and Welch, 1996;
Buckley and Ghauri, 1999; Cohen, 2007; Aguilera
and Crespi-Cladera, 2016). Less is known about the
choices of pathways of investment and, in partic-
ular, the layering of those investments through
chains of subsidiaries. However, as we argue in this
paper, the legal structure of the subsidiaries, which
involves strategic tax planning, is an essential
dimension of competitive business enterprise in
today’s world. Conversely, the organization of
corporate entities along chains of subsidiaries, and
the location of vital economic and accounting data
among the different components of the group, offer
vital clues into corporate strategies. Whereas con-
solidated accounts are important for comparative
research, this study shows that data at the subgroup
level are also important. Equity mapping could
therefore open an entirely new and fruitful avenue
for IB research.
Such perspective requires a different way of
thinking about policy from a world that is focused
on states and corporate entities seen in isolation, to
a policy that is aimed at identifying and countering
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relationships among entities and jurisdictions
within firm networks. Here lies a promising oppor-
tunity for IB research to engage in interdisciplinary
research with public policy, governance and other
social sciences to further acknowledge the signifi-
cant role that MNE’s play in the global and national
society and reconsider how to regulate it. This
article advances organizational theory into MNEs
and global regulatory policy; and future research
should concern itself with details into how regula-
tion can become more effective, of course without
becoming overbearing or diminishing the oppor-
tunities that lie in a global market.
Research Limitations and Future Directions
Equity-mapping research is in its infancy, but
already some important limitations are noticeable,
several of which were discussed in this article.
Financial and accounting data derive from corpo-
rate filings, which, particularly from entities
located in the US or in OFCs, is often limited. This
proved less of a problem for this study, which
focused on accounting data generated from corpo-
rate entities that are controlled by ‘in-betweeners’,
and the majority of those were located in jurisdic-
tions that both demands and provide access to the
data. Nonetheless, some of the firms in our sample
did not reach either a visibility index or pre-
consolidated index of 50% and above. Whether or
not those firms have chosen purposely to relocate
large proportions of their operating revenues to less
transparent jurisdictions could be a subject of
further research. Overall, the anecdotal evidence
gathered by this study suggests that, among other
things, firms ‘arbitrage’ rules of transparency as
well.
This study lends support to a growing consensus
among academics and regulators alike about the
dangers of profit shifting. For the time being,
however, equity-mapping research can only point
to the location of opportunity spaces for tax
arbitrage. Quantitative estimation of profit-shifting
and tax arbitrage would most probably require the
development of mixed methodologies, combining
equity mapping with more traditional methods of
research.
While much of the previous decades has seen
regulators and researchers focused on geographical
and legal structuring of entities in paying tax,
attention must now turn to the organizational
structure of MNEs. Equity mapping provides a
useful pathway to both analyse existing data and
find new patterns of entity structure. Despite the
acknowledged difficulties in such research, it will
be a fruitful method for further study.
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NOTES
1Accounting categories such as revenues, profit
and the like, are notoriously difficult because their
precise meaning and definition may vary from one
jurisdiction to another. In this article, we use
categories of ‘operating revenues’ and ‘net income’
as provided by the Orbis database. The accounting
category of operating revenues would usually, but
not always, mean net sales.
2The concept of tax arbitrage is used extensively
in legal literature. In the words of Karayan et al.,:
‘tax arbitrage is typically behind artificial transfer
pricing schemes, that is, using accounting entries
to shift profits to jurisdictions that impose the
lowest net taxes’ (Karayan et al., 2002: xix). It
‘enable[s] (the taxpayer..) to elect the less compre-
hensive tax base or the one with the more lenient
anti-abuse rules’ (HJI Panayi, 2011: 11).
3This is true in principle, although certain anti-
abuse rules, like the Controlled Company Rules
(CFC) that was introduced by the US in the early
1960s, and then adopted with a number of varia-
tions by other countries, require some members of
the group to be treated collectively as one taxpayer.
See: (Dueñas, 2019; HJI Panayi, 2011; Lokken, 2005;
Sandler, 1998).
4‘Step book’ is a term used by lawyers and
accountants to describe the internal memos or
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reports provided by accountants or legal teams
presenting corporate charts and establishing the
rationale for the organization of a set of new
corporate entities in a chain. The famous Luxleak
files contain separate files of over 300 MNEs, each
with their partial step book of the Luxembourgish
component of a proposed structure to be reviewed
by the Luxembourg tax authority.
5As one of the leading experts on corporate profit
shifting practices acknowledges: ‘Multinational
corporations routinely use tax havens for treasury
operations and group insurance. Some of these
activities have legitimate roles’ (Zucman, 2013: 13).
6This research had been the preserve of specialist
due diligence firms that develop schematic repre-
sentations of firm equity architecture using a
variety of sources, including where available access
to the firms’ step books, and manually cross-check
information (Peppitt, 2008). The focus of this
research had been so far practical, driven by the
challenges and expense of accessing data. As a
result, there has not been a substantial theoretical
or methodological discussion of the challenges
presented by corporate equity mapping research
(Broe, 2008; Mintz, 2004).
7Sometimes, it is impossible for there to be a
complete direct ownership chain connecting one
reporting entity to another. This can occur for
instance when foreign firms list on the US stock
market via the use of American depository receipts
(ADRs). Here, the legal entity itself is not created in
a particular state with shareholdings that connect
the entity directly to a foreign owner. Rather, it is
an entity created for listing purposes, such as when
Toyota Motor Corp. lists on a US stock exchange.
These mechanisms were created to allow foreign
entities the ability to list on the US stock market
without the potential constraints that may come
with US purchasers buying shares in foreign coun-
tries. The listed entity, in this case, is a distinct
entity given the rules of how that particular
securities market works, the ADR representing the
accounting values allocated to that listed entity.
This illustrates how indirect reports may not always
signify the invisibility of a third-party entity in
between.
8Net income can be negative as well as positive,
and in extreme cases, may represent large pools of
re-distributable profits, or large stocks of ‘losses’,
illustrating how the construction of losses (‘loss-
shifting’ so to speak) can itself be part of how value
is managed within a corporate group.
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